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The Role of Tuition, Financial Aid Policies, and Student Outcomes on  
Average Student Debt 
Abstract 
Rising college student debt levels have recently received considerable media 
coverage and have even been the topic of policy proposals that link rising student 
debt with tuition inflation.  This paper examines the role that tuition, financial aid 
policies, and academic outcomes play in determining variation in average student 
debt levels across higher education institutions.  A focus solely on tuition as the 
culprit in rising student debt misses the significant role that financial aid policies
and student outcomes play in determining debt levels across non-profit higher 
education institutions.  Specifically, being need-blind in admissions, meeting-full-
need, limiting loans, and graduating students in high paying majors can have a 
larger impact on student debt levels than simply the cost of attendance.
  
 
 
                                                          
   
Introduction
 Higher education institutions in the United States have recently come under increasing 
attack for graduating students with debt levels that are considered by many to be overly 
burdensome.  Recent headlines highlight the fact that aggregate student debt has now surpassed 
total credit card expenditures in the United States.  For example, a headline from an October 
2011 USA Today issue reports that, “Student Loan Debt Surpasses $1 Trillion.”  The article goes 
on to discuss that students borrowed over $100 billion in the previous year alone.  A 2012 report, 
Grading Student Loans, by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York points out that of the 
37 million borrowers who have outstanding student loan balances as of the third-quarter of 2011, 
14.4 percent, or about 5.4 million borrowers, have at least one past due student loan account. 
Cumulatively, these past due balances amount to $85 billion, or approximately 10 percent of the 
total outstanding student loan balance. 
The College Board’s annual Trends in Student Aid (2011) reports that in the 2009-2010 
academic-year approximately 55 percent of public four-year college students who graduated 
from the institutions at which they began their studies graduated with some level of student debt. 
Their average cumulative level of borrowing was approximately $22,000. Similarly, about two-
thirds of those earning bachelor's degrees from private nonprofit institutions had debt averaging 
$28,100. Borrowing in the Federal Stafford Loan Program (both subsidized and unsubsidized) 
among all students increased by 61 percent from 2000-01 to 2010-11, from $3,256 to $5,253 per 
FTE, in constant 2010 dollars.1 
1 Figure 1. College Board’s Trend in Student Aid 2011.  
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Clearly student borrowing and cumulative student debt levels have increased dramatically 
over the past decade.  This rise in debt levels coupled with the stagnant employment market 
caused by the recession of 2007 to 2009 has led to increases in default rates and student debt 
balances in arrears. The general angst surrounding student borrowing has prompted calls for 
political action to alleviate the onerous burden of student debt experienced by some of the 
borrowers. These actions, so far, have led to legislation extending the interest rate cap of 3.4 
percent on new subsidized Stafford loan borrowing for another year.  There have also been calls 
for legislation allowing student debt to be forgiven when declaring bankruptcy, an action that is 
not permitted under current bankruptcy laws, although no action has been taken on this front as 
of yet. Similarly, President Obama, in a January 2012 speech at the University of Michigan said 
that higher education has become an imperative for success in the United States, but the cost has 
grown unrealistic for too many families and the debt burden unbearable.  This speech followed in 
the wake of his State of the Union address where he outlined a proposal that would deny 
institutions access to federal financial aid funds if they did not hold tuition increases in check.
The cacophony of discourse concerning the escalating cost of higher education and the 
rising levels of student debt is clearly beginning to have political ramifications for the higher 
education industry. Colleges and universities are feeling tremendous pressure to control their 
tuitions and total costs or risk losing vital levels of federal support.  All of this in an environment 
where public universities are experiencing dramatic reductions in state levels of support. 
The focus on tuition levels as the sole culprit in rising levels of student debt, however, 
may dramatically miss the mark.  Surely, tuition rates and sticker prices (tuition, fees, room, 
board, books and expenses) have a hand in determining student debt levels, but so too should the 
2 
  
 
 
 
financial aid and admissions policies of an institution influence student debt levels.  Institutions
that admit more affluent students should have lower levels of student borrowing than a college 
that caters to the less well to do. Similarly, colleges and universities that are need-blind in 
admissions, a practice that is usually perceived to be advantageous for less affluent students, may 
lead to higher levels of average student debt, ceteris paribus, while institutions that pledge to 
meet the full demonstrated need of all enrolled students will likely have lower levels of student 
borrowing. On the other hand, institutions that “gap”, that is they do not fully meet all of the 
demonstrated need of their students with financial aid, would be expected to have higher levels 
of student borrowing. These admissions and financial aid policies may play a significant role in 
determining the level of borrowing and student debt at an institution.   
Similarly, students who are more likely to graduate and who pursue majors in fields with 
greater earnings potential should be more willing to assume debt in pursuit of their degrees. As a 
result, one would expect institutions with higher graduation rates and a higher proportion of 
degrees awarded in more lucrative majors would have higher levels of average student debt.   
The primary focus both in the media and the political arena has been on the role of tuition 
in determining student debt levels.  This paper will examine the role that admissions and 
financial aid policies and student outcomes play in determining the level of student debt across 
institutions conditional on the cost of attendance at four-year, non-profit colleges and 
universities. 
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Literature Review 
There is a scarcity of analysis directly addressing the institutional determinants of 
average student debt levels. There is greater coverage of the importance of student loans on 
college enrollment and choice decision, and on the implications of student debt on educational 
outcomes.  The following brief literature review highlights the most recent and applicable of the 
studies on loans and their implications. 
The literature on the impact of student borrowing on college enrollment and specific 
college choice decisions is in general agreement on the positive influence that student borrowing 
plays on enrollment decisions, at least for some students.  For example, Buss, Parker, and 
Rivenburg (2004) utilize data from a set of selective liberal arts colleges and find that student 
loans increase the likelihood of enrollment, at least within this selective sector of higher 
education. Similarly, Linsenmeier, Rosen, and Rouse (2006) take advantage of a unique natural 
experiment at a private, highly selective university that eliminated loans for all low-income
students. They found that enrollment increased by a rather paltry 3 percentage points as a result 
of this policy change, and the increase was not statistically significant.  On the other hand, they 
found a more robust and statistically significant increase of 8 to 10 percentage points in the 
likelihood of enrollment among minority applicants.  Examining the broader question of whether 
no-loan policies have a significant impact on matriculation decisions Waddell and Singell (2011) 
conclude that adopting a policy of no-loans (all grant aid) for low-income students leads to the 
matriculation of students with higher levels of financial need.  The primary conclusion of these 
and most other studies is that reducing student loan levels has a positive, although not necessarily 
a particularly large, impact on the enrollment decisions of low-income students. 
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Another vein of the student debt literature examines the impact of student borrowing on 
various measures of educational outcomes.  For example, Minicozzi (2005) finds that higher  
levels of student debt upon graduation leads students to take higher paying first jobs, but jobs 
with lower wage growth. Tumen and Shulruf (2008) and Monks (2001) conclude that higher 
levels of student indebtedness do not discourage students from pursuing additional investments 
in education; however, Luong (2010) reports that student borrowers had lower savings rates, less 
assets, less net worth, and are less likely to own their own home by age 29.  Similarly, Rothstein 
and Rouse (2011) once again utilizing a natural experiment at a single, private, highly selective 
(anonymous) university find that higher levels of debt prompt graduates to choose higher paying 
jobs, and those with more debt are less likely to choose “public interest” jobs.  This is consistent 
with a study by Erica Field (2009), who finds that loans have a negative and statistically 
significant impact on choosing public service employment among a set of law school graduates 
from New York University.  Most recently, Avery and Turner (2012) frame higher education and 
student debt as an investment with an uncertain payoff.  Their general conclusion is that for most 
students the payoff to an undergraduate degree is worth the level of debt assumed by most 
students. In summary, the results concerning the impact of debt on educational outcomes is quite 
mixed and depends heavily on the sample of graduates examined and the outcome being 
examined. 
Macy and Terry’s (20007) study is perhaps the analysis that most closely approximates 
the question addressed in this paper. Examining data from the top 200 colleges and universities 
based on the U.S. News and World Report, they conclude that tuition and fees is the single most 
significant determinant of variation in average student debt levels across institutions.  They also 
find that the percent of students with debt, the size of the institution, the endowment value, the 
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percent of classes with fifty or more students, the alumni giving rate, and the percent of Hispanic 
students are significant in determining variation in average student debt levels across institutions.   
 This paper contributes to this literature by investigating the impact of admissions and 
financial aid policies and student outcomes on average student debt.  The existing literature has 
focused on the influence of loans on enrollment decisions or the impact of loans on educational 
outcomes.  Only one other study to my knowledge has examined variation across institutions in 
average student debt, but was not able to control for differences in institutional aid policies and 
student outcomes and the role they play in determining average student indebtedness.  This 
study will fill that void. 
Data
The data for this analysis comes from the College Board’s 2011 Annual Survey of 
Colleges (ASC) merged with the 2011 Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System 
(IPEDS) database. The ASC data set contains survey responses from 3,920 accredited 
undergraduate colleges and universities across the United States.  To participate in the survey an 
institution must offer at least an associate’s degree and be accredited by a regional or national 
accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Department of Education.  According to the 2011 
U.S. Digest of Education Statistics there are 4,599 degree granting institution in the United 
States, so the Annual Survey of Colleges sample represents over 85 percent of all degree 
granting institutions, and an even higher percent of accredited degree granting institutions. 
6 
  
    
The focus of this paper is on variation in average student debt across non-profit, four year 
colleges and universities. Toward this objective I impose a number of restrictions on the data set 
to construct the sample used in this analysis (see Table 1).  I eliminate for-profit institutions as 
they rarely reported average debt levels in this survey (892 institutions), and institutions whose 
highest degree awarded is an associate’s degree (1,040), as it is inappropriate to compare 
borrowing for two years of study to indebtedness for four years of education.  I also eliminated 
observations where important variable values were not reported.  Specifically, I omit 
observations where the institution did not report the percent of students with debt or the average 
debt (1,000), the percent of the class receiving financial aid or the reported percent was greater 
than 100 percent (191), or the percent of need met with financial aid and/or the cost of 
attendance (50). These restrictions result in a final sample of 747 four-year, bachelor’s degree or 
higher awarding, accredited institutions, with valid data on the financial aid profile of their 
graduating classes. 
The primary focus of this analysis concerns average student debt levels across 
institutions. The Annual Survey of Colleges questionnaire defines indebtedness as the 
“aggregate dollar amount borrowed through any loan program (federal, state, subsidized, 
unsubsidized, private, etc.; excluding parent loans) while the student was enrolled at an 
institution. Student loans co-signed by a parent are assumed to be the responsibility of the 
student and should be included.” There are two measures of average student debt utilized in this 
paper: 1.) average student debt for those with debt; and, 2.) total average debt among all 
graduates, including those who did not borrow.  The first is usually the number presented in the 
popular media.  For example, a New York Times (2012) expose on student borrowing reports 
that among borrowers the average student debt in 2011 was $23,300, citing the Federal Reserve 
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of New York report mentioned above.  The sample of institutions used in this analysis has 
average (across institutions) student debt among borrowers of $ 24,646 (see Table 2 for summary 
measures).  The undergraduate enrollment weighted average student debt used in this paper is 
$22,799. These results indicate that the restrictions placed on the sample outlined above do not 
appear to skew the results toward significantly higher or lower average levels of student debt.  
Similarly, the total average debt, including non-borrowers, in the sample used in this paper is 
$16,769 (across institutions), while the undergraduate enrollment weighted average is $13,772.        
Additional variables used in this analysis include dummy variables indicating whether the 
institution admitted its 2010-2011 fall class in a need-blind manner (that is they did not consider 
an applicant’s financial aid profile in determining whether to admit them or not), and if they met 
the full demonstrated need of all admitted students.  Meeting-full-need means that all of the 
difference between the tuition, room, and board of an institution and what a family is expected to 
contribute for their child’s higher education expenses is met with grant aid, loans, or work-study.  
The opposite of meeting-full-need is called “gapping”.  The degree or percent to which an 
institution gaps its students, on average, is also used as a control variable in this analysis.  The 
expectation is that the more an institution gaps its students the higher the level of student debt.  
As meeting-full-need can be achieved with varying degrees of loans versus grant aid, I also 
include dummy variables indicating whether an institution has a policy of no-loans for all 
students, such that all of a student’s demonstrated need is met with grant aid, and a dummy 
variable for whether an institution has a policy of limited loans, such that students below a 
certain income threshold have all of his or her need met with grant aid, as defined by The Project 
on Student Debt for 2009-2010. Other control variables used are the percent of the entering class 
receiving financial aid, the percent of the entering class receiving Pell grants, and the median 
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SAT score of the entering class. These variables are intended to capture the economic profile of 
the student body. The lower the percent of the class receiving aid and Pell grants the more 
affluent the class, ceteris paribus. Similarly, the higher the SAT score of the class the more 
affluent the student body generally, given the high, consistent and positive correlation between 
family income and standardized test scores.  I use the total cost of attendance (tuition, fee, room, 
board, books and expenses) to measure the cost of the institution.  For public universities I use an 
undergraduate enrollment weighted average of the in-state and out-of-state cost of attendance.  I 
also include total expenditures per student in order to examine whether institutions with greater 
resources utilize that wealth to reduce the level of borrowing of its students.  I also include 
among the independent variables in the following analyses the four year undergraduate 
graduation rate and the percent of all graduates who obtained degrees in majors with above 
median earnings.  These majors were identified from the Center on Education and the Work 
Force’s 2012 analysis of earnings by college major. The majors with above median earnings are 
engineering, mathematics and statistics, physical sciences, science technologies, social sciences, 
health professions, and business. Controls for public versus private institutions, highest degree 
awarded, and institutional size are also utilized in the following analyses.
Empirical Results
The following regression analyses investigate the influence of price, admissions 
practices, financial aid policies, and student outcomes on the average student debt of the 
graduating classes across non-profit, four year postsecondary institutions in the United States.  
Specifically, Table 3 presents the results of regressing the average student debt among borrowers 
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(Specification (1)) on the cost of attendance, expenditures per student, dummy variables for 
being need-blind in admissions, meeting-full-need, a no-loan policy, and limited-loan policy, the 
average percentage of demonstrated need not met by financial aid (the percent gap), the percent 
of the entering class receiving financial aid, the percent with Pell grants, the percent of graduates 
with higher paying majors, the SAT mid-point (average of the 25th and 75th percentile scores on 
the SAT critical reading and math tests), the four year graduation rate, the number of full time
equivalent (FTE) degree seeking undergraduates (as a measure of institutional size), and dummy 
variables for public control (versus private control), highest degree awarded of masters, or 
highest degree awarded doctorate (versus bachelor’s degree).   All average debt levels, cost of 
attendance, and expenditure per student values are in natural log form, so that the coefficient on 
the natural log of cost and expenditures per student indicate the elasticity of student debt with 
respect to these variables, while the coefficients on the other variables approximate the 
percentage change in student debt for a unit change in the independent variables.  Meeting-full-
need is included as a control variable in addition to the percent gap because adhering to such a 
policy may have a differential impact on student borrowing beyond that of simply having a gap 
of zero percent. Meeting-full-need is a relatively simple policy to explain to prospective students 
and thus may lead to a different applicant pool than would occur if an institution is not 
constrained by this policy. All regressions are estimated using weighted least squares, where the 
weight is full-time-equivalent undergraduate enrollment to account for the varying institution 
sizes used in calculating the average debt levels.    
Specification (1) in Table 3 presents the results of the regression of the natural log of 
average student debt among borrowers on the exogenous variables outlined above.  Before 
turning to the variables of primary concern it is interesting to note that there is not a significant 
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difference in average indebtedness between public and private institutions, among borrowers.  
Similarly, institutional size (number of FTE undergraduates) and type (baccalaureate, masters, 
doctoral) are not significant in determining average student indebtedness.   
The quality of the institution as measured by the SAT mid-point is significant in 
determining the average student debt among borrowers. Institutions with higher average SAT 
scores have lower levels of student borrowing.  This may be because of the strong correlation 
between student SAT scores and family income and because institutions with higher average 
SAT scores also tend to be institutions with greater institutional resources which they may be 
able to use to lower student borrowing. Turning to the variables and policies of primary interest, 
it is not surprising to discover that the cost of attendance is significant in determining student 
debt. It is interesting, however, to find that cost is inelastic in determining student debt.  The 
elasticity of student debt with respect to tuition is only .209.  This implies, for example, that a 10 
percent increase in the cost of attendance results on average in a 2.1 percent increase in average 
student debt.  Institutional expenditures per student, a measure of both institutional resources and 
expenses, significantly increases average student borrowing.  It appears that institutions with 
higher levels of spending per student pass at least some of these higher expenses on to their 
students in the form of increased levels of student debt.  Once again this effect while statistically 
significant is inelastic in magnitude.   
Admissions and financial aid policies play a significant role in determining student 
borrowing. Institutions that report to be need-blind in admissions have average student 
indebtedness that is approximately 33 percent (exp(.282)-1) higher than comparable institutions 
that are not need blind in admissions.  Evaluated at $24,000 in student debt this translates to 
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approximately $7,800 in additional borrowing at need-blind institutions compared to those that 
are not need-blind in admitting their freshmen class.  While it is usually considered beneficial for 
applicants and students for an institution to practice need-blind admissions, as it creates greater 
opportunities for students from lower-income families, it appears to have the unintended 
consequence of leading to higher average debt levels as more low income students constitute the 
subsequent graduating class.   
On the other hand, institutions that meet the full demonstrated need of their students have 
significantly lower levels of student debt upon graduation.  Specifically, institutions that meet-
full-need have average student debt that is approximately 17 percent (exp(-.182)-1) lower than 
institutions that do not meet-full-need.  This is not surprising as students at institutions that gap 
may have to turn to additional loans to meet their education expenses.  It is surprising to discover 
that the percent of gapping by an institution does not have a statistically significant impact on 
student debt upon graduation.  It may be that families turn to other forms of funding such as 
home equity or PLUS loans in the presence of substantial gapping.  It is also surprising to note 
that the percent of students receiving financial aid does not play a significant role in determining 
average debt among student borrowers, while the percent of students receiving Pell grants 
actually lowers the level of debt among borrowers.  It appears to be the case that, conditional on 
the other regressors, the more students that receive Pell grants the lower the level of debt needed 
to meet educational expenses.  In part it seems that Pell grants are replacing loans for low income
students or that institutions that limit loan levels to their students attract more Pell recipients. 
The above outlined results imply that being need-blind increases average student debt,
while meeting-full-need lowers student debt.  Meeting-full-need may mean dramatically 
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different things across institutions.  For example, a student with demonstrated need of $20,000 
may have all of that need met with grant at one institution, while another institution meets half 
that need with loans and half with grant aid.  Clearly, the borrowing implications of these 
meeting-full-need policies are quite different. To account for these differences I include a 
dummy variable for institutions that have a no-loans policy for all of their students on need-
based aid, and a separate dummy variable for institutions that have a limited-loans policy 
whereby students below a given income threshold have all of their need met with grant aid.   
Despite these policies, students, of course, are free to borrow on their own.  These policies have 
a significant impact on student borrowing.  Institutions with no-loans policies have average 
student debt (from all sources) that is 47 percent lower than comparable institutions without this 
policy. Similarly, institutions with a limited-loan policy have average borrowing that is 
approximately 12 percent lower.   
Pricing and financial aid policies should not be the sole criteria students utilize in 
determining their level of borrowing, and in fact they are not.  The higher the graduation rate of 
an institution the higher should be the level of average student debt.  Likewise, the percent of the 
graduating class with degrees in majors with above median expected earnings the higher should 
be the level of student debt upon graduation. As expected the higher the likelihood of graduation 
and the better the employment prospects of an institution’s graduates the higher their level of 
average debt.  
In short, it appears that the cost of attendance plays a statistically significant, important, 
but inelastic effect on student debt, while the financial aid policies of being need-blind, meeting-
full-need, and policies of restricting or even eliminating loans are all significant and meaningful 
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in determining the average student debt levels among borrowers.  The expected academic and 
labor market success of an institution’s graduates also are significant in determining student 
indebtedness. 
The total average student debt among all graduates from an institution, including non-
borrowers, is perhaps a more meaningful and comprehensive measure of the debt burden placed 
on an institution’s graduates.  For example, an institution where only twenty percent of the 
students borrow but has average debt among borrowers of $30,000 is arguably placing less of a 
loan burden on its graduates than an institution where eighty percent of its graduates have an 
average debt of $25,000. Specification (2) of Table 3 regresses the natural log of the total 
average student debt (including non-borrowers) against the independent variables.  While many 
of the results are qualitatively similar to the previous results the magnitudes of their effects are 
usually even larger in determining total average debt in comparison to the average debt only 
among borrowers. 
Once again, the cost of attendance and expenditures per student have positive and 
statistically significant but inelastic effects on student debt.  Being need-blind and meeting-full-
need are also significant in determining total average debt and the magnitudes of their effects are 
noticeably larger than their effects on average student debt just among borrowers.  Similarly, the 
percent of students with aid has a positive, significant, and even larger impact on total debt than 
it does on average debt among borrowers. No-loan and limited-loan policies significantly reduce 
total student debt, as well. The influence of the graduation rate and the mix of majors is once 
again significant in determining total student debt, with amplified effect.  In short, all of the 
factors that were found to be significant in determining average student debt among borrowers 
14
  
  
 
are also significant in determining the total average student debt, including non-borrowers.  The 
primary difference in the results is in the size of the coefficients.  In particular, the coefficients 
on the financial aid and academic outcome variables are substantially larger in magnitude.  
Ignoring non-borrowers and the impact of policy changes on whether one borrowers or not can 
have an even larger impact on the true level of average debt than just focusing on the level of 
debt among borrowers. 
All of the above analyses implicitly assume that the impact of costs and aid policies on
debt levels is the same across the public and private higher education sectors.  Chow-tests reject 
the null hypothesis of equality of the coefficients across the public and private sectors (at the 1 
percent level) for both the regression using the natural logs of average student debt (F-stat=3.37) 
and total average student debt (F-stat=2.83). 
Table 4 presents the regression results for both measures of student debt for public 
institutions only. The results in some instances vary dramatically across higher education sector.  
Specification (1) reports results for the regression of the natural log of average student debt 
among borrowers at public institutions.  It is interesting to find that the cost of attendance is not 
significant in determining average student debt across public institutions.  On the other hand, 
expenditures per student is positive and significant in determining student debt.  Public 
institutions usually have much more comparable levels of cost of attendance (at least within 
state) but considerable variation in the expenditures per student.  Flagship state institutions 
usually have much higher levels of expenditures per student.  It appears that these additional 
costs are passed on to students in the form of loans.  
15
  
 
 
 
 
Public institutions that admit their class on a need-blind basis have higher average student 
debt than those that do not. Few public institutions adhere to meeting-full-need and thus the 
coefficient on this variable, while negative, is not statistically significant.  Similarly, there are no 
public institutions in this sample that have a no-loan policy, while the public institutions that 
have a limited-loan policy graduate students with average debt that is approximately 14 percent 
lower than those that do not. The higher the percent of the class receiving Pell grants the lower 
the level of debt.  This again suggest that Pell grants may be acting to replace loans or that 
institutions are actively attempting to lower the loan levels of their neediest students.   
Academic outcomes influence debt levels in the public sector, as well.  The higher the 
four year graduation rate the higher the level of student debt at graduation, as expected.  
Similarly, the higher the proportion of graduates in top paying fields the greater the level of 
student debt, although this result is not significant at conventional levels (p-value=.143, two-
tailed test). As was found overall, public institutions with higher average SAT scores have lower 
levels of student debt. 
Perhaps the most striking result among public institutions is that the cost of attendance is 
not a significant determinant of student debt.  Financial aid policies and institutional practices 
and policies in the form of expenditures, graduation rates, and the mix of majors are important in 
determining student borrowing at public institutions.   
Specification (2) of Table 4 presents the results of regressing total average student debt 
(including non-borrowers) on the policy variables, at public institutions.  The primary difference 
in results from specification (1) is that the percent of students receiving aid is positive and 
significant in influencing total average student debt, but not the level of debt among borrowers.  
16
  
 
 
 
 
Public institutions with a high percent of student on financial aid do not appear to adjust the level 
of debt incurred by their borrowers in response to these numbers, but obviously it does affect the 
level of total average student debt.
As was found in the overall regressions, those variables that are significant in 
determining average student debt among borrowers are also significant in determining total 
average student debt across all students at public institutions, with magnitudes that are even 
larger. For example, following a need-blind admissions policy increased average student debt by 
48 percent, but increased total average student debt by 64 percent.  Similarly, having a limited 
loan policy lowered debt by 13 percent among borrowers, and by 22 percent across all students.  
Specification (1) of Table 5 outlines the results for the regression of average student debt 
among borrowers for private colleges and universities.  The cost of attendance is positive and 
significant in determining student debt among borrowers, with an elasticity of .610.  This result 
is likely attributable to the fact that tuition levels at private universities are much higher than at 
public universities, so that a ten percent increase in the cost of attendance at a typical private 
university represents a much larger dollar increase in cost.  On the other hand, expenditures per 
student is not significant in determining student debt levels.  For private universities, being need-
blind in admissions does not have a significant impact on average student debt, but meeting-full-
need does have a statistically significant influence on student debt.  This result may be because 
private institutions have a higher average sticker price, so meeting-full-need may have a bigger 
impact on debt than the mix of students admitted.  More of the students at private institutions 
may have to take on debt than at public institutions, and among private institutions this is even 
more pronounced at institutions that do not meet-full-need.  The degree of gapping is not 
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statistically significant, while the percent of students with aid does significantly influence the 
levels of debt among borrowers.  Private institutions with a higher percentage of students on 
financial aid pass along those costs to borrowers in the form of higher loans. 
Unlike public institutions there are a number of private institutions with either no-loan or 
limited-loan policies.  Private institutions with no-loan policies have significantly and 
substantially lower average student debt levels than institutions that do not have this policy. On 
the other hand, private institutions with limited-loan policies do not have significantly different 
levels of student debt than institutions without this policy.  It may be the case that the income
thresholds on these limitations capture a small percent of all families on financial aid at private 
institutions. 
The four year graduation rate is not significant in determining average debt at private 
institutions, but the mix of majors is.  The higher the percent of graduates in high paying majors 
the higher will be the level of average student debt.  It may be the case that students at private 
institutions have higher graduation expectations, so they are less concerned with variation across 
institutions in graduation rates.  The average graduation rates at institutions in this sample are 53 
and 29 percent at private and public institutions, respectively. The average percent of graduates 
in high paying majors are 43 and 44 at private and public institutions, respectively. 
Specification (2) of Table 5 presents the results for total student debt at private 
institutions. Once again, cost of attendance is positive and significant in determining total 
average student debt, with an estimated elasticity of .817.  This suggests that an institution with 
total average student debt of $15,000 upon graduation would see average debt increase by 
approximately $1,225 for a ten percent increase in the cost of attendance. Similarly, meeting-
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full-need, but not being need-blind, is statistically significant in determining total average student 
debt. Private institutions that meet-full-need have total average student debt that is 
approximately 18 percent lower than private institutions that do not meet-full-need.  For an 
institution with total average debt of $15,000, this translates to a reduction in total average debt 
upon graduation of approximately $2,700.  The percent of the student body receiving aid 
positively and significantly influences total average student debt, as well.  Once again, adhering 
to a no-loan policy substantially lowers total average student debt, while an increase in students 
from higher paying majors leads to higher levels of total average student debt.    
The primary finding from the above analyses is that while the cost of attendance clearly 
plays a significant role in determining levels of student debt across institutions at private 
institutions (but not at public institutions), it is not the sole, nor necessarily the primary, driver in 
determining variation in average student debt levels across institutions.  Admissions and 
financial aid policies and academic outcomes also are major factors in differentiating student 
debt levels across institutions. Specifically, being need-blind in admissions has a significant 
impact on average debt levels across public institutions, while meeting-full-need has a significant 
impact on borrowing at private colleges and universities.  Similarly, no-loan and limited-loan 
policies have a significant impact on the levels of average student debt across institutions.  
Academic selectivity is also significant in influencing average debt levels across all institutions.  
The higher the average SAT score of an institution, the lower the levels of average debt. Students 
also appear to respond as expected to the likely value of their educational investments.  In 
general, the higher the likelihood of graduation the higher is the level of average debt at 
graduation. Similarly, the greater the percentage of students with top paying majors the higher is 
the level of average debt. Additionally, a focus on average debt among borrowers rather than the 
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total average debt ignores the importance of and variation in the percent of the student body that 
graduates with debt across institutions. 
Conclusion 
Recent media coverage of growing student debt and the subsequent policy proposals to
address it have assumed that tuition and university sticker prices are the primary if not sole factor 
driving the rise in student indebtedness.  This assumption ignores the substantial impact that 
college and university admissions and financial aid policies and academic outcomes play in 
determining variation in average student debt levels across institutions.  In fact, this paper finds 
that while the cost of attendance does play a statistically significant role in determining student 
debt levels at private institutions, admissions and financial aid policies, graduation rates, and the 
mix of majors across students are also significant and important in determining student debt 
levels. Specifically, whether an institution is need-blind in admitting its students and/or meets 
the full demonstrated need of all of its students can increase average student debt upon 
graduation by as much as thirty percent.  The impact of these policies varies substantially across 
higher education sectors. Being need-blind has a significant impact on student borrowing at 
public institutions, while meeting-full-need has a statistically significant impact on student debt 
at private institutions.  Additionally, no-loan and limited-loan policies are also important in 
determining student debt levels, even conditional on broader financial aid policies. 
Public universities that adhere to a need-blind admissions policy have a higher average 
student debt upon graduation.  A need-blind admissions policy is usually viewed as a positive 
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and socially beneficial practice that increases the probability of enrolling more low-income
students. In the event that this policy is effective in increasing low-income enrollment it clearly 
leads to higher levels of average debt upon graduation, as the mix of students at a particular 
institution becomes less affluent.  If institutions are penalized for having higher levels of student 
debt, this may lead them to adopt admissions and financial aid policies that are less conducive to 
enrolling low-income students.  Institutions, both public and private, may become more selective 
in admissions with a heightened focus on SAT scores, which are highly, positively correlated 
with family income, and thus highly, negatively correlated with student debt.  Similarly, 
institutions may no longer practice need-blind admissions, but rather turn to need-aware 
admissions practices in order to manage the income profile and subsequent borrowing levels of 
their student bodies. While this will clearly lead to lower levels of student debt, it is not clear 
that doing so is a social welfare improving outcome. 
The results of this paper clearly indicate that policy advocates interested in rising college 
costs and escalating student debt should not simply focus on tuition levels and tuition inflation, 
but rather focus policy directives on admissions and financial aid policies that affect net price 
and encourage students to pursue fields with an adequate return on investment despite the level 
of debt. Policies that solely focus on tuition levels and tuition growth are overly simplistic and 
ignore other important factors in determining student debt. 
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Table 1 
Sample Construction 
Total Sample 3920 
Less: 
For-profits 892
 Highest Degree Associates 1040
        Didn't report average debt or  1000
 percent with debt 
Pct. of class with financial aid not 
reported or greater than 100% 191
      Pct. of need met or cost of attendance 
not reported 50 
 Final Sample 747 
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Table 2 
Summary Measures
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Percent of students with loans 1 100 65.89 16.83 
Average debt among borrowers $947 $56,000 $24,646 $7,677 
Total average debt (incl. non- $119 $47,600 $16,769 $7,787 
borrowers) 
Public institution 0 1 0.36 0.48 
Cost of attendance $8,986 $58,334 $33,537 $12,616 
Expenditures per student $5,291 $270,834 $26,153 $22,728 
Need-blind 0 1 0.88 0.33 
Meet-full-need 0 1 0.08 0.26 
Percentage of gap 0 98 24.86 16.74 
No. of FTE undergraduates 129 46,994 5,644 6,805 
SAT mid-point 760 1515 1108.79 135.66 
Percent of students on financial aid 0 1 0.81 0.13 
Percent high paying majors 0 1 .43 .16 
4-yr graduation rate 0 92 44.13 22.07 
Percent of students with Pell grants 6 100 30.59 13.88 
Highest degree awarded: 
Masters 0 1 0.36 0.48 
Doctorate 0 1 0.47 0.50 
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Table 3 
Regression Results 
Constant
Spec. (1) 
 7.215 
(0.769) 
*** 
 Spec. (2) 
6.194
(1.076)
*** 
Natural log of cost of attendance .209 
(0.076) 
*** .279
(0.106)
*** 
Natural log of expenditures per student .140 
(0.037) 
*** .143
(.052)
*** 
Need-blind .282 
(0.041) 
*** .373
(0.057)
*** 
Meet-full-need -.182 
(.074) 
** -.289
(0.103)
*** 
Percent gap -.00002 
(.001) 
-.001
(0.001)
Percent of Students with Aid .001 
(.001) 
.007
(0.002)
*** 
No loan policy for need-based aid -.643 
(0.115) 
*** -.875
(0.161)
*** 
Limited loan policy for need-based aid -.125 
(0.043) 
*** -.221 
(0.060)
*** 
Four year graduation rate .004 
(0.001) 
*** .008
(0.002)
*** 
Pct. of grads in high-paying majors .301 
(0.111) 
*** .427
(0.155)
*** 
Pct. of students receiving Pell grants -0.005 
(0.002) 
*** -.004
(0.002)
* 
No. of FTE undergraduates 
(in 1,000s)
.0001 
(0.002) 
-.002
(0.002)
SAT mid-point
(in 100s)
-.108 
(0.022) 
*** -.196
(0.031)
*** 
Publicly controlled -.070 
(0.057) 
-.100
(.079)
Masters awarding university .073 
(0.066) 
.046
(0.092)
Doctoral awarding university .041 
(0.066) 
.014
(0.092)
R-squared        .305 .380 
Notes
Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
*** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
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Table 4 
Regression Results for Public Institutions 
Constant
Spec. (1) 
 8.757 
(1.485) 
*** 
 Spec. (2) 
8.054
(2.133)
*** 
Natural log of cost of attendance .001 
(0.153) 
.029
(0.220)
Natural log of expenditures per student .174 
(0.063) 
*** .191
(.091)
** 
Need-blind .395 
(0.074) 
*** .492
(0.106)
*** 
Meet-full-need -.168 
(.294) 
-.656
(0.422)
Percent gap .001 
(.001) 
-.0005
(0.002)
Percent of Students with Aid -.001 
(.002) 
.005
(0.003)
** 
Limited loan policy for need-based aid -.136 
(0.103) 
** -.249 
(0.099)
** 
Four year graduation rate .005 
(0.002) 
** .010
(0.003)
*** 
Pct. of grads in high-paying majors .366 
(0.250) 
.554
(0.359)
Pct. of students receiving Pell grants -0.004 
(0.003) 
* -.005
(0.004)
No. of FTE undergraduates 
(in 1,000s)
.001 
(0.003) 
-.002
(0.004)
SAT mid-point
(in 100s)
-.110 
(0.040) 
*** -.210
(0.057)
*** 
Masters awarding university .196 
(0.277) 
.190
(0.398)
Doctoral awarding university .104 
(0.274) 
.134
(0.394)
R-squared        .232 .244 
No. of observations 271 
Notes
Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
*** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
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Table 5 
Regression Results for Private Institutions 
Constant
Spec. (1) 
 4.528 
(0.734) 
*** 
 Spec. (2) 
2.468
(0.948)
*** 
Natural log of cost of attendance .610 
(0.073) 
*** .817
(0.094)
*** 
Natural log of expenditures per student -.006 
(0.041) 
-.069
(.053)
Need-blind .020 
(0.040) 
.048
(0.051)
Meet-full-need -.153 
(.054) 
*** -.199
(0.069)
*** 
Percent gap -.0001 
(.001) 
.0001
(0.001)
Percent of Students with Aid .003 
(.001) 
** .009
(0.002)
*** 
No loan policy for need-based aid -.434 
(0.074) 
*** -.608
(0.095)
*** 
Limited loan policy for need-based aid .010 
(0.068) 
0.003 
(0.088)
Four year graduation rate -.0002 
(0.001) 
.001
(0.002)
Pct. of grads in high-paying majors .155 
(0.082) 
* .265
(0.106)
** 
Pct. of students receiving Pell grants -0.003 
(0.002) 
** .001
(0.002)
No. of FTE undergraduates 
(in 1,000s)
.003 
(0.003) 
-.003
(0.004)
SAT mid-point
(in 100s)
-.090 
(0.023) 
*** -.150
(0.029)
*** 
Masters awarding university .008 
(0.041) 
-.001
(0.053)
Doctoral awarding university .089 
(0.045) 
** .058
(0.055)
R-squared        .491 .651 
No. of observations 476 
Notes
Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
*** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
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